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This paper looks at the organization Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). It 
argues against the prevailing view that ISIS is a part of the Global Salafi Jihad, 
finding instead that ISIS is a product of the sectarian strife in Iraq and Syria. 
While many may assume that ISIS’s supporters are little more than fanatical 
jihadists, I argue that given what we know about other domestic conflicts, 
ISIS members are more likely to join the fighting as a result of material incen-
tives and the consequences of violence itself. Using daily interval event data 
I show that ISIS is more a sectarian insurgency than an international terror 
organization. I then explore the ways in which the conflict in Iraq and Syria 
helps ISIS solve its collective action problem. I find that Shia violence against 
Sunnis, ISIS’s material resources, and ability to govern all contribute to the 
likely growth of, at least, tacit support for ISIS among Sunni communities in 
Iraq and Syria.
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Introduction
The establishment of an Islamic Caliphate by the group Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) might appear as the pinnacle achievement of the global Islamist move-
ment. After all, this is what Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda claimed as their goal 
since the late 1990s; however, in this paper I offer that the dynamics in the current 
conflict in Iraq and Syria is less about Islamism, terrorism and what is often referred 
to as the Global Salafi Jihad (Sageman 2004), than it is about Iraq and the broader 
region’s sectarian politics. 
While ISIS may be regarded by many as a form of the “New Terrorism”, i.e. 
terrorism that is primarily religiously inspired, overly zealous and without the tra-
ditional constituent constraints found in secular or ethnic based insurgent groups 
(Hoffman 2013), using data on violent attacks in Iraq and Syria for 2013, I argue 
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that rather than a war stemming from the Islamist ideology and religious zeal, the 
current conflict in Iraq is a sectarian civil war. After providing evidence in support 
of this first assertion, I then draw on the domestic conflict and mobilization litera-
ture to better explain why individuals might be willing to fight for ISIS, how ISIS 
interacts with its constituents in a bid for broader support, and how the group’s 
leaders materially benefit from the conflict. All of which paint a more compelling, 
rigorous, and nuanced picture of the conflict’s dynamics than one in which the on-
going violence is primarily seen as the consequence of extreme ideological com-
mitment.
Local Islamists
Though ignored by many policy-makers and the media, most so-called Islamist 
movements do not aspire to global conquest (Hoffman 2013), nor are they members 
of what Sageman refers to as the Global Salafi Jihad (2004). Rather, groups like Ha-
mas, Hezbollah, Boko Haram and other Islamic terror groups are rooted in national/
political conflicts concerning a given state or situation. Most of these groups do not 
meet the criteria of the “New Terrorism” which argues that they are more ideologi-
cal, religious, irrational and fanatical than previous ethno-nationalist and secular 
ideological terror groups (Hoffman 2013; Brown 2007). 
In the wake of such brutal actions like the beheading of journalists, aid work-
ers, and soldiers, public crucifixions, and other horribly violent acts perpetrated by 
ISIS, it is hard to argue that ISIS does not consist of ideological or religious fanatics. 
Yet, all civil wars in the 20th century have been witness to very high and nearly con-
stant levels of violence, much of it barbaric (Francisco 2010; Brown 2013). When 
trying to understand the situation in Syria and Iraq it is important to remember that 
civil wars are the most violent form of domestic conflict (Francisco 2010) and as a 
result they are inherently chaotic affairs in which who is fighting whom and why is 
not always easy to ascertain (Kalyvas 2003). Viewing ISIS and the conflict in Syria 
and Iraq as a purely ideological conflict weakens our ability to effectively understand 
the current situation, and more importantly, to identify appropriate ways to arrest its 
escalation. In order to fully grasp the dynamics of the conflict in Iraq and Syria, it is 
necessary to try and formulate a better understanding of who is fighting in the con-
flict and why it is they fight. I argue that this conflict is less about Islam and Islamism 
than it is about sectarian divisions between Sunni and Shia in Iraq and Syria.
Shia/Sunni Strife and ISIS’s Origins
We can think of ISIS as having both an ideological origin and an organizational 
origin. Ideologically speaking, ISIS shares the same Islamist roots with other or-
ganizations like Al Qaeda and the Islamic Group. These stem back to the goal of 
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spreading Islam in the 20th century by the Muslim Brotherhood and the writings of 
Hassan Al Banna, as well as the puritanical 18th century Salafist ideology advocat-
ed by Abd al Wahhab. Most notably the modern Islamist ideology is indebted to the 
writings of Sayyid Qutub, who advocated an Islamist Vanguard similar to Lenin’s 
Party State. Qutub’s idea was that a return to Islam was needed in order to right the 
ills of the modern day Middle East, or even the broader Muslim World. This would 
involve the removal and destruction of secular state institutions in order to build 
a state and society based on Islam, the Quran, Hadith and Sharia law. In Qutub’s 
view a violent, revolutionary Muslim organization was the best way to mobilize 
supporters and overthrow the secular and Western backed regimes in the Middle 
East. Over the last 30 years groups like Al Qaeda, Islamic Group and Islamic Ji-
had have all based their political orientations, espoused motives and goals oriented 
around Qutub’s ideas (Sageman 2004). At the same time, groups like Egyptian Is-
lamic Jihad, Islamic Group and Hamas have used Qutub’s writings and message 
with the goal of mobilizing opponents to the regimes and rulers in their own states 
and territories, or what Sageman refers to as the jihad at home (Sageman 2004; 
Brown 2007). Al Qaeda, on the other hand, pioneered the global jihad and what 
Sageman refers to as the jihad abroad (2004) by advocating attacks on all infidels, 
particularly Americans at home and abroad. What we see then is that Qutub’s writ-
ing and the Islamist ideology have been used to advocate jihad in distant lands, 
with the example of foreign fighters fighting in Afghanistan during the Soviet oc-
cupation, and again under the US occupation, while also being suited to the local 
and domestic political goals of groups like Hamas, who only engage in violence 
against Israel (Brown 2007). Though there are international aspects within the Is-
lamist ideology, most Islamist groups have focused on the jihad at home and at-
tempted to both overthrow the existing regimes and mobilize supporters within a 
clear domestic constituency. 
Though ISIS shares the same ideological orientation as many Islamist groups, 
organizationally the group’s origins come from Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), formed 
shortly after the 2003 US invasion. Though AQI shared the Al Qaeda brand, it and, 
later, ISIS do not appear to have placed much emphasis on the global jihad in the 
same way that Al Qaeda has done in the past. Namely, AQI’s violence was always 
locally contained. Of course, it could be argued that AQI was focused on Iraq since 
there were US soldiers occupying the country. AQI’s attacks on US soldiers could 
then be considered part of both the domestic and global jihad. Currently, ISIS may 
in fact have aspirations to take part in the global jihad, however, by looking at the 
organization’s rise, its support and local actions, we can see that it is much more 
concerned with local sectarian fighting than it is with global jihad. Though ISIS 
has been implicated in carrying out attacks in Paris in 2015 and Brussels in 2016, 
I believe that to reduce the organization’s raison d’être, and more importantly its 
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individual members to fighting a Global Salafi Jihad is to mischaracterize the fun-
damental difference between ISIS and Al Qaeda. Moreover, such a viewpoint can 
distort our understanding of how ISIS has emerged, how it has mobilized its sup-
porters, and who fights for ISIS. 
In making my case it is important to note a key difference between Al Qaeda 
and AQI (later ISIS).Where Al Qaeda emphasized the jihad abroad, targeting name-
ly American and European targets, the majority of ISIS attacks have taken place in 
Syria and Iraq, showing that it has decided to focus on the jihad at home (see Table 1). 
Al Qaeda, even before the US invasion of Afghanistan, never possessed or attempt-
ed to create its own state. Nor did the organization engage in a domestic insurgency 
designed to either overthrow an existing state or create its own. In Sudan and Af-
ghanistan, Al Qaeda was hosted by each country’s respective regime. Therefore we 
must understand that aside from its former links with the Al Qaeda brandname, ISIS 
is altogether a different kind of group with a different set of priorities, chief among 
them being the creation and governance of a state. As a result of this state building 
program, ISIS places a strong emphasis on sectarian violence, mainly between the 
two dominant denominations in Islam, Sunni and Shia. ISIS is attempting to create 
a pure Sunni state. In this sense, its brand of Islamism is akin to sectarian national-
ism. 
Looking at interval event data on ISIS attacks from 2011 to 2013 (2014 is not 
yet available) one sees that violence increased in Iraq a year after the US withdrew 
its forces in 2011; however, instead of it focusing on the US and coalition forces as 
the earlier violence had done, the main targets have been civilians with 200 attacks 
out of 419 occurring against civilians and private property in Iraq in 2013. Fol-
lowed in descending frequency by attacks on police, businesses, military and other 
government targets (see Table 2). The emphasis on attacking private citizens and 
property supports the idea that this conflict is largely sectarian in nature. Based on 
media reports we can assume that the majority of these attacks have been on Iraq’s 
Shia and dwindling Christian minority. Additionally, a breakdown of ISIS attacks 
across neighborhoods in Baghdad reveals that the group is more prone to launching 
attacks in Shia populated neighborhoods. Out of 171 attacks, 121 were carried out 
in Shia dominated neighborhoods (see Table 3). 
What is more revealing is that in 2013 most of ISIS’s actions occurred not in 
Syria, where the civil war has been ongoing since 2011, but in Iraq. Iraq saw 419 
ISIS attacks in 2013, while Syria witnessed 25. What the data indicate is that ISIS is 
more an Iraqi phenomenon than one related to the Syrian conflict or even the Global 
Salafi Jihad. Even though the group’s origins lie in AIQ, the reemergence of the or-
ganization is rooted in the Sunni-Shia politics of Iraq. 
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After the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, the minority Sunnis were removed from 
power. Since then, the majority Shia have largely been in control of the country’s 
security forces and institutions. Over the last few years groups like Human Rights 
Watch have charged that former Prime Minister Nuri Al-Maliki’s regime was en-
gaged in a campaign of violence and harassment of Iraq’s Sunnis. The documented 
abuses include extrajudicial killings, air strikes, and torture (Human Rights Watch 
25 April 2013). This is not to suggest that ISIS’s actions are justified by the actions 
of the Al-Maliki regime, rather it demonstrates that unlike Al Qaeda and ISIS’s ear-
lier incarnation AQI, which was anti-Western and part of the Global Salafi Jihad, 
the growth and support that ISIS has received in Iraq over 2012-2014 is in part due 
to the domestic political situation in Iraq. Moreover, focusing on the recent Sunni-
Shia strife in Iraq adds further weight to the argument that the ongoing conflict is 
one that can best be described as a sectarian civil war. Based on this observation we 
can begin to better understand who fights for ISIS and why, by looking at what we 
know about other sectarian and ethnic civil wars. 
Participation in Violent Conflict
In the remainder of the paper I use the literature on domestic conflict to create a 
framework through which we can better understand ISIS and the dynamics of the 
conflict in Iraq and Syria. 
I begin by first establishing that like any other dissident organization, ISIS has 
had to overcome its collective action problem. The collective action problem exists 
when individuals must act together in the pursuit of a public good. Given that once 
the public good is attained it is available to everyone, most people will prefer to free 
ride rather than actively participate in its acquisition (Olson 1965; Lichbach 1998). 
When it comes to forms of collective violence, the collective action problem is as-
sumed to be even greater. Lichbach’s five per cent rule offers that 95 per cent of the 
time, less than five per cent of a public good’s supporters will actively engage in 
attaining it (Lichbach 1998). In order to understand participation and the dynamics 
of conflict, we need to determine how insurgents and insurgent leaders overcome 
their collective action problem. 
Overcoming the collective action problem often requires that organizations 
and their leaders provide participants with some individual, selective incentive. Re-
search has shown that ideology and grievances are usually insufficient in overcom-
ing the insurgent collective action problem (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Taydas et 
al. 2011; Hoeffler 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003). At a material level selective in-
centives often take the form of loot stripped from the battlefield, or salaries paid 
by the organization with the revenue made from battlefield loot (Collier and Hoef-
fler 2004; Weinstein 2007). For example in the War in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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and Croatia, Serb paramilitary groups stripped almost everything of value from the 
villages under their control (Silber and Little 1996). Some of this loot went to the 
paramilitary leaders and members, while the rest went to Belgrade (Stewart 2008). 
There is certainly a case to be made for the importance of material incentives in 
Iraq. Estimates put ISIS’s revenue from smuggled oil to be at one million dollars a 
day. The organization’s total assets were believed to total around two billion dollars 
in June 2014. The monthly salary for your average ISIS insurgent is said to be 400 
dollars a month. Interestingly, according to the World Bank this amount is slightly 
lower than the average per capita income in Iraq. One should take into considera-
tion that amid a blossoming civil war, especially in the war-affected areas, steady 
salaries may be harder to come by, making 400 dollars a month worth more in ISIS 
controlled areas than elsewhere in Iraq. Regardless of the regional value of this 
lower than average pay, the organization’s ability to generate revenue and its vast 
supply of resources shows that there is a case to be made that the ISIS insurgency is 
in large part fueled by its ability to pay and effectively enrich some of its members. 
However, given the history and level of sectarian strife in Iraq, and the sectari-
an nature of ISIS’s involvement in the conflict, ISIS is likely able to use the violence 
itself as a means of recruitment and mobilization. As mentioned above, anti-Sunni 
violence in Iraq has been a growing concern since US forces withdrew. Since Sunni 
protests began in 2013 and ISIS’s military advance over the summer of 2014, during 
which they took Mosul, Sunnis have become targets for government supported Shia 
militia. Some of these militia are accused of being little more than death squads. 
Writing in the London Review of Books, veteran Middle East correspondent Patrick 
Cockburn supports the earlier observations of HRW, stating that:
Because the army is performing no better than before, the main fighting forces fa-
cing Isis are the Shia militia. Highly criminalized, they are fighting hard around 
Baghdad to drive back Isis and cleanse mixed areas of Sunni population. Sunnis 
are often picked up at check points, held for ransoms of tens of thousands of dol-
lars and usually murdered even when the money is paid. (Cockburn 2014: 10)
The Iraqi Government has strong ties with Shia militia groups. In fact some of 
their leaders are in the Government. Hadi al-Amiri, the leader of the Shia militia the 
al-Badr Brigades, is the current Iraqi Minister of Transport (as of 2014). A junior 
member of al-Badr was appointed as the Minister of the Interior after the US dis-
approved of al-Amiri’s appointment. The inclusion of Shia militia leaders into the 
Government, as well as the state’s reliance on these militias are likely to only in-
crease support for ISIS, exacerbating the Shia-Sunni rift in Iraqi society. 
Research of past conflicts shows that amid random violence aimed at civilians, 
it actually becomes safer to join the insurgency than it does to remain a bystander. 
Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) argue that in such cases participation becomes less 
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costly than not participating. The support and investment provided to members of 
the insurgent organization gives the insurgents better odds at surviving the conflict. 
Brutal counterinsurgency policies, coupled, in the case of Iraq, with sectarian vio-
lence, are actually more likely to harm non participants than participants. Kalyvas 
and Kocher (2007) use the case of the US’ Phoenix Project in Viet Nam as a case 
study. They find that for every insurgent targeted by US and RVN (Republic of Viet 
Nam) forces, 38 innocent civilians were also targeted. The odds of survival actu-
ally improve for members of the insurgency. The reason being that insurgents are 
given the resources, training, and support by the insurgent organization to evade the 
suppression of the state and its allies. The War in Croatia also saw a positive rela-
tionship between Serb attacks on municipalities in Croatia and an increase in par-
ticipation in Croatian armed forces. Thereby, providing empirical confirmation to 
Kalyvas and Kocher’s hypothesis: violence fosters increased participation in con-
flict (Brown 2013). 
Given the indiscriminate nature of the Shia militia attacks on Sunni civilians 
described by Cockburn and Human Rights Watch, it is logical that support for ISIS 
has grown as the organization is better able to defend or protect members of the 
Sunni community. In this sense, we should be mindful that support for ISIS among 
its members or its broader constituency is likely to be contingent on its ability to 
provide for the community in terms of safety for members and in other cases of 
governance (I explore this further on). Regarding ISIS’s popularity and support as 
something that stems from the ideological commitment of extreme adherents to Is-
lam is likely to be far too reductive to be useful in establishing a competent under-
standing of the conflict. 
One example of the lack of ideological commitment is seen in an unlikely tac-
tic: suicide bombing. One of ISIS’s main tools in the conflict is the use of suicide 
bombing. While suicide bombing is often depicted as the most extreme act of reli-
gious devotion, the literature offers that suicide bombing is both a rational and tac-
tical tool in asymmetrical war. Mia Bloom finds that ideological conflicts are less 
likely to feature suicide bombing (Bloom 2005). Ethnic and sectarian conflicts are 
more prone to suicide bombings as they serve to both further divide the community 
along sectarian lines, while also provoking reprisals within the community from 
which the suicide bombers come. Such actions in turn work to the advantage of the 
insurgent organization as heavy handed counterinsurgency tactics work to further 
outrage the targeted community, thereby fostering an environment where suicide 
bombings are a more acceptable form of violent retribution. 
The situation in Iraq and Syria reveals what many other conflicts have also 
shown: the more the state or state-related allies fight an insurgency, the more sup-
port for that insurgency can grow. The sectarian dimensions of the conflict in Iraq 
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and Syria, both those perpetrated by ISIS and state-backed Shia militia, have led 
to its escalation and continuation, reinforcing the support for its belligerents, and 
likely causing many individuals to join them.
Governance
In addition to the consequences violence has on community support for insurgent 
organizations and the use of suicide terrorism, insurgents can also foster support by 
providing stability for communities under their control. As civil wars are the worst 
kind of domestic conflict, stability is often hard to come by. In the absence of state 
power, the vacuum caused by the conflict is filled with multiple parties. This situ-
ation can lead to what Mancur Olson referred to as roving bandits (1982). Roving 
bandits are the worst situation for individuals and society. In the conditions of a 
Hobbesian state of anarchy created by an ongoing conflict, roving bandits, such as 
militia, soldiers, and paramilitary groups from all sides of the conflict prey on the 
populace, looting and excising rents (not to mention killing) without providing any 
of the former public goods that the state once offered, namely security, services and 
the enforcement of contracts. Since different bandits come and go, each with their 
own demands, rules, and orders, regular citizens are left with nothing but uncertain-
ty about the future and the next batch of bandits’ demands. Under these conditions, 
the arrival of a stationary bandit is often met with open or at least tacit approval. 
The stationary bandit seeks to collect revenue from the populace, but also to defend 
against other bandits. 
In the chaos of Syria’s conflict, ISIS has become the stationary bandit. The 
areas under its control have returned to some level of stability. Though ISIS en-
acts harsh reprisals for theft, blasphemy, and collaborating with its enemies, it also 
provides the semblances of a bureaucratic state. In Raqqa, ISIS’s Syrian headquar-
ters, the organization has built a new market, installed new power lines, initiated 
public transport and fixed potholes on the streets. ISIS has orphanages where chil-
dren and parents displaced by the conflict are often reunited. They even organize 
fairs for children, complete with ice cream and inflatable slides. They also run soup 
kitchens, offer health services, including vaccination programs against polio (Zelin 
2014).
These efforts of state building and governance, though far removed from what 
most of the population may actually want, do provide stability in a chaotic envi-
ronment. They also provide ISIS with a community that is more willing to support 
them, making the insurgent organization’s job of mobilizing, recruiting and arming 
its insurgents, as well as developing a market and economy capable of financing the 
leadership and insurgency, possible. In short, good governance can help insurgent 
organizations more easily solve their collective action problem. 
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Leaders
Though it is useful to look at what might drive members of the general populace 
to support an insurgent group, it is also productive to look at the incentives leaders 
have in mobilizing members and pursuing insurgency. First, we see that most lead-
ers come from a social and educational background that is higher than their follow-
ers (Francisco 2010). Moreover, insurgency without leadership is next to impossible. 
Leaders are instrumental in deploying solutions to the collective action problem. The 
invisible hand of revolution does not exist, it requires leaders to organize, provide in-
centives, acquire and distribute resources (Lichbach 1998; Francisco 2010).
Insurgent leaders throughout history have gained an international reputation, 
gone from terrorist to statesman, using their position as a revolutionary to become 
the leader of a country or political movement, and profited immensely from the strug-
gle that they in many ways caused. Lenin, Castro, and Gerry Adams from the IRA 
are just a few examples. Insurgent and revolutionary leaders often receive the largest 
selective incentive from the conflict and one that is similar to other politicians the 
world over, profit and power. No doubt, becoming an insurgent leader is a life chang-
ing event. One that often takes these individuals from obscurity to the world stage. 
The leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, fits in with the company of past in-
surgent leaders. He has a PhD in Islamic studies, and went from a quiet, unassuming 
man living in a small apartment in Baghdad, to being the self-declared leader of all 
Muslims worldwide. He also now controls an organization with billions of dollars 
in assets and an income of around one million dollars a day. While his religious zeal 
may be what motivates him, we can also be certain that the money, importance, and 
power have their perks as well. 
Discussion and Conclusion
ISIS and the conflict in Iraq and Syria reveal how problematic and persistent civil 
wars can be. The sectarian nature of ISIS’s militancy, as revealed by the event data, 
also demonstrates that the war in Iraq and Syria is likely not to be part of the Global 
Salafi Jihad, nor are its participants necessarily ideological or religious zealots. Rath-
er, the conflict is spurred on by its own violence and the ability of ISIS to use the cha-
os caused by the fighting to its own advantage. We see that through its acquisition of 
territory, loot, and resources ISIS is able to adequately compensate its members ma-
terially. Past conflicts reveal that as random and indiscriminate violence increases, so 
too does participation within the insurgent organization (Kalyvas and Kocher 2007; 
Brown 2013). We also see that bringing some form of stable governance to areas 
once racked with instability is a way for insurgent groups to gain tacit support from 
the community. All of which have contributed to the rise of ISIS. Most importantly, 
the above observations better explain the fighting in Iraq and Syria, ISIS’s effective-
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ness, and the organization’s support among the community than assuming all of the 
above depends on the religious dedication of its members to wage jihad. 
In the world of domestic conflict, sadly, this is nothing new (Lichbach 1998; 
Kalyvas 2003; Weinstein 2007; Francisco 2010). Moreover, the organization’s lead-
ers and their self-interest give them little incentive to stop the fighting. ISIS is or-
ganized, profitable, and so far leading an effective insurgency against Shia regimes 
in Iraq and Syria. 
The question then becomes what means will actually help degrade and destroy 
ISIS? Unfortunately there is no easy answer. As the literature and evidence suggest, 
military force is unlikely to be a winning solution. While the options for a politi-
cal resolution have long been exhausted by the chaos of the US invasion of Iraq, 
the civil war in Syria, and the destructive sectarian policies of Iraq’s Shia majority 
government. 
By seeing the origins of ISIS’s support in the context of the domestic Shia-
Sunni strife, rather than as purely a result of ideological commitment, policy-makers 
could began to attempt to foster the creation of power sharing institutions within Iraq 
and Syria. Such a plan could offer a more promising future to Shia and Sunni alike, 
or at least one that is more promising than years of endless violence. The second op-
tion would be some form of sectarian partitioning; however, this would likely cause 
further bloodshed and need to include the Kurds in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Any 
effective solution is likely to require the full support of the international community. 
Unfortunately the geopolitical divisions within the region, such as Russia’s support 
for Iran and Syria, and the US’s opposition to Iran and Russia, as well its support 
for the Sunni Gulf States and Turkey, minimizes the likelihood of the international 
community bringing forth the effort and resources such an endeavor would require. 
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